Crowdsourcing Cybersecurity: Cyber Attack Detection using Social Media by Khandpur, Rupinder Paul et al.
Crowdsourcing Cybersecurity:
Cyber Aack Detection using Social Media
RUPINDER PAUL KHANDPUR1,2, TAORAN JI1,2, STEVE JAN3,
GANG WANG3, CHANG-TIEN LU1,2, NAREN RAMAKRISHNAN1,2,
1Discovery Analytics Center, Virginia Tech, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
2Department of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, Arlington, VA 22203, USA
3Department of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24060, USA
Social media is oen viewed as a sensor into various societal events such as disease outbreaks, protests, and elections. We describe
the use of social media as a crowdsourced sensor to gain insight into ongoing cyber-aacks. Our approach detects a broad range of
cyber-aacks (e.g., distributed denial of service (DDOS) aacks, data breaches, and account hijacking) in an unsupervised manner
using just a limited xed set of seed event triggers. A new query expansion strategy based on convolutional kernels and dependency
parses helps model reporting structure and aids in identifying key event characteristics. rough a large-scale analysis over Twier,
we demonstrate that our approach consistently identies and encodes events, outperforming existing methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s widespread incidences of cyber-aacks (e.g., most recently of the US Democratic Party and at companies
such as Sony, Verizon, Yahoo, Target, JP Morgan, Oce of Personnel Management, Ashley Madison), each more
audacious than earlier ones, makes them perhaps the primary threat faced by individuals, organizations, and nations
alike. Consequences and implications of cyber-aacks include monetary losses, threats to critical infrastructure and
national security, disruptions to daily life, a potential to cause loss of life and physical property, and data leaks exposing
sensitive personal information about users and their activities. e largely quasi-static and unadaptable nature of
existing cyber-defenses makes them vulnerable to rapidly evolving aack mechanisms, and thus engender not just a
‘warning decit’ but also a ‘detection decit’, i.e., an increase in the mean time between the time of an aack and its
discovery.
It has been well argued that, because news about an organization’s compromise sometimes originates outside the
organization, one could use open source indicators (e.g., news and social media) as indicators of a cyber-aack. Social
media, in particular, turns users into social sensors empowering them to participate in an online ecosystem of event
detection for happenings such as disease outbreaks [34], civil unrest [22, 40], and earthquakes [31]. While the use of
social media cannot fully supplant the need for internal telemetry for certain types of aacks (e.g., use of network ow
data to detect malicious network behavior [6, 14, 23]), analysis of such online media can provide insight into a broader
range of cyber-aacks such as data breaches, account hijacking and newer ones as they emerge.
At the same time it is non-trivial to harness social media to identify cyber-aacks. Our objective is to detect
a range of dierent cyber-attacks as early as possible, determine their characteristics (e.g., the target, the
type of attack), in an unsupervised manner. Prior work (e.g., [29]) relies on weak supervision techniques which
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will be unable to capture the dynamically evolving nature of cyber-aacks over time and are also unable to encode
characteristics of detected events, as we aim to do here.
Our main contributions are:
• A framework for cybersecurity event detection based on online social media. Our dynamic event
trigger expansion (DETE) approach uses a limited, xed, set of general seed event triggers and learns to map
them to specic event-related expansions and thus provide situational awareness into cyber-events in an
unsupervised manner.
• A novel query expansion strategy based on dependency tree patterns. To model typical reporting
structure in how cyber-aacks are described in social media, we propose a dynamic event trigger expansion
method based on convolution kernels and dependency parses. e proposed approach also employs a word
embedding strategy to capture similarities between event triggers and candidate event reports.
• Extensive empirical evaluation for three kinds of cyber-attacks. We manually catalog ground truth for
three event classes—distributed denial of service (DDOS) aacks, data breaches, and account hijacking—and
demonstrate that our approach consistently identies and encodes events outperforming existing methods.
2 PROBLEM SETUP
e input to our methodology is a collection of time-ordered tweets D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dp } organized along p time slots.
LetD denote the tweet space corresponding to a subcollection Di , letD+ denote the target tweet subspace (in our case,
comprising cyber-aack events), and let D− = D − D+ denote the rest of the tweets in the considered tweet space.
Denition 1. Typed Dependency ery: A typed dependency query is a linguistic structure that characterizes
a semantically coherent event related topic. Dierent from n-grams, terms contained in a typed dependency query
share both syntactic and semantic relationships. Mathematically, a typed dependency query is formulated as a tree
structure G = {V ,E}, where node v ∈ V can be either a unigram, user mention, or a hashtag and ε ∈ E represents a
syntactic relation between two nodes.
Denition 2. Seedery: A seed query is a manually selected typed dependency query targeted for a certain type
of event. For instance, “hacked account” can be dened as a potential seed query for an account hijacking event.
Denition 3. Expandedery: An expanded query is a typed dependency query which is automatically generated
by the DETE algorithm based on a set of seed queries and a given tweet collection D. expanded query and its seed
query can be two dierent descriptions of the same subject. More commonly, an expanded query can be more specic
than its seed query. For instance, “prime minister dmitry medvedev twier account hack”, an expanded query from
“hacked account”, denotes the message of an account hijacking event related with Dmitry Medvedev.
Denition 4. Event Representation: An event e is dened as (Qe ,date, type), where Qe is the set of event-related
expanded queries, date denotes when the event happens, and type refers to the category of the cyber-aack event (i.e.,
DDOS, account hijacking, or data breach).
Here Qe is a dened as a set because, in general, a cyber-aack event can be presented and retrieved by multiple
query templates. For instance, among online discussion and report about event “Fashola’s account, website hacked”, the
query template most used are “fashola twier account hack”, “fashola n78m website twier account hack” and “hack
account”.
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Given the above denitions, the major tasks underlying the cyber-aack event detection problem are dened as
follows:
Task 1: Target Domain Generation: Given a tweet subcollection D, target domain generation is the task of
identifying the set of target related tweets D+. D+ contains critical target related information based on which the
expanded query can be mined.
Task 2: Expanded ery Extraction: Given target domain D+, the task of expanded query extraction is to
generate a set of expanded queries Q = {q1, . . . ,qn } which represents the generic concept delivered byD+. us set Q
can be used to retrieve event related information from other collection sets.
Task 3: Dynamic Typedery Expansion: Given a small set of seed queries Q0 and a twier collection D, the
task of dynamic typed query expansion is to iteratively expand Dk+ and Qk until all the target related messages are
included.
3 METHODOLOGY
In traditional information extraction (IE), a large corpus of text must rst be annotated to train extractors for event
triggers, dened as main keywords indicating an event occurrence [10]. However, in our scenario using online social
media, a manually annotated label set is impractical due to the huge volume of online media and the generally noisy
characteristics of the text. In this section, we propose a novel method to automatically mine query templates over
which the event tracking is performed.
3.1 Target Domain Generation
In this subsection, we propose the method of target domain generation, which serves as the source of social indicators
for the detection of ongoing cyber-aack events. Given a query and a collection of tweetsD, the typical way to retrieve
query-related documentation is based on a bag of words model [33] which comes with its aendant disadvantages.
Consider the following two tweets: “has riseups servers been compromised or data leaked?” and “@O2 You completely
screwed me over! My phones back on, still leaking data and YOU are so UNHELPFUL #CancellingContract #Bye”.
ough the important indicator “leak data” for data breach aack is involved in both tweets, the second tweet is
complaining about a phone carrier and is unexpected noise in our case. To address this problem, syntactically bound
information and semantic similarity constraints are jointly considered in our proposed method.
More specically, each tweet inD is rst converted into its dependency tree form. us for a given seed query q, the
target domain D+ ⊆ D can be generated by collecting all tweets which are both syntactically and semantically similar
to the seed query q. Mathematically, given two dependency trees q and d , a convolution tree kernel [11] is adopted to
measure the similarity using shared longest common paths:
K(q,d) =
∑
u ∈q
v ∈d
(
1 +H(u,v))1R>0 (H(u,v)) (1)
where v and u are two nodes from two trees q and d respectively, R>0 represents set of positive real numbers, 1(·) is
the indicator function andH(v,u) counts the number of common paths between the two trees which peak at v and u,
which can be calculated by an ecient algorithm proposed by Kate et al. [11], as described in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Calculation of number of common paths.
Input: u ∈ q, v ∈ d
Output: H(u, v)
1 Set count = 0, r = κ(u, v);
2 Set Cu = children(u);
3 Set Cv = children(v);
4 for ci , c j ∈ Cu, i , j do
5 for cm, cn ∈ Cv ,m , n do
6 if ci  cm and c j  cn then
7 x = κ(ci , cm );
8 y = κ(c j , cn );
9 r = r +
√
λ + λx + λy + λxy
10 H(u, v) = r ;
In Algorithm 1, κ(u,v) is the number of common paths between the two trees which originate from u and v , and can
be recursively dened as:
κ(u,v) =
∑
µ ∈C(u)
η∈C(v)
(1 + κ(µ,η))1µη (u,v), (2)
whereC(·) denotes the set of children node. In both Algorithm 1 and Equation 2, we use the semantic similarity operator
, introduced to consider the semantic similarity of tree structre. is semantic similarity is computed by considering
cosine similarity of word embeddings vector generated from the word2vec algorithm.
is model considers the common paths which are linguistically meaningful, which reduces the noise introduced
by coincidentally matched word chains. In addition, long-range dependencies between words, which decreases the
performance, are avoided because functionally related words are always directly linked in a dependency tree.
3.2 Dynamic Typedery Expansion
In this subsection, we propose a way to dynamically mine an expanded query given a small collect of seed query, as
shown in Table 1. By providing a small set of seed queries (unigrams), Zhao et al. [40] proposed a dynamic query
expansion (DQE) method which is able to iteratively expand the seed query set from currently selected target tweet
subspace until convergence. Looking beyond the simple unigrams based expansion, by introducing dependency-based
tree structure extraction, we build a dynamic expanded query generation model for the cyber-aack detection task.
Table 1. Seed queries for cyber-aack events.
Category Seedery
Data breach data leak, security breach, information
stolen, password stolen, hacker stole
DDoS DDoS aack, slow internet, network inl-
trated, malicious activity, vulnerability ex-
ploit, phishing aack
Account Hijacking unauthorized access, stolen identity, hacked
account
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Let us denote Qk , Dk+ as the expanded query set and target domain at the kth iteration. Before the iteration process,
Q0 is initialized by the manually selected small set of seed queries, as shown in Table 1. With D and Q0, then D0+,
the target domain at iteration 0, is generated based on the convolution tree kernel, as described in Equation 1. At the
kth iteration, given last expanded query set Qk−1 and last generated target domain Dk−1+ , our approach rst prepares
candidate expanded queries for each matched qi ∈ Qk−1 and d ∈ Dk−1+ :
qˆki = subgraph
(
argmax
v ∈d
(
∑
u ∈qi
H(v,u))), (3)
where v and u are term nodes in tweet d and qi respectively, and subgraph(·) is an operator to extract the subtree
structure from entire tree withv as root. us the candidate query expansions are collected based on relevant document
and query space, that is Dk−1+ and Qk−1. To identify the best candidate expanded queries, query terms are then ranked
based on Kullback-Leibler distance [20] between target domain Dk−1+ and the whole tweet collection D:
KL(f ,Dk−1+ |D) = log
Pr(f |Dk−1+ )
Pr(f |D) Pr(f |D
k−1
+ ), (4)
where KL(f ,Dk−1+ |D) denotes the Kullback-Leibler distance, f is any term in qˆki , Pr(f |Dk−1+ ) and Pr(f |D) is the
probability of term f appears in Dk−1+ and D respectively. Using the KL distance to rank query terms we are able to
assign scores to terms that best discriminate relevant and non-relevant expansions. For example query terms such
“account” and “twier” both appear frequently in the candidate expansions but they have lile informative value as they
will have the same (random) distribution in any subset of the twier collection, whereas terms such as “hacked” will
have comparatively higher probability of occurence in the relevant subspace. ese high ranked candidates will then
act as the expanded queries set to run the next iteration until the algorithm converges. e detailed dynamic typed
query expansion algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Dynamic Typed ery Expansion Algorithm.
Input: Seed query Q0, Twier subcollection D
Output: Expanded ery Q
1 Set D0+ =match(Q0, D), k = 0;
2 repeat
3 k = k + 1;
4 for qi ∈ Qk−1 do
5 q̂ki = subtree(argmax
v∈d
∑
u∈qi
CPP (v, u));
6 for f ∈ q̂ki do
7 Pr(f |Dk−1+ ) = t f (f )|Dk−1+ | ;
8 Pr(f |D) = t f (f )|D| ;
9 w (f ) = KL(f , Dk−1+ |D);
10 w (q̂ki ) =
∑
f ∈q̂ki
w (f );
11 Qk = topK (w (Q̂k )), Q̂k = {q̂k1 , . . . , q̂k|Q̂k | };
12 Dk =match(Qk , D);
13 until
k⋃
i=0
Qi −
k−1⋃
i=0
Qi , ∅// DQE iteration;
14 Q = Qk ;
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3.3 Event Extraction
Given an expanded query set Q, we extract Qs | qi * qj | qi ,qj ∈ Qs . For example, consider the surface string
representations of a set of expanded queries Q as (“data breach”, “data leak”, “ashley madison”, “ashley madison data
breach”) then Qs will be (“ashley madison data breach”). We then cluster the query expansions in Qs using anity
propagation [9] and also extract exemplars qe , of each query set Qe that are representative of clusters, where each
member query is represented by a vector q˜ calculated from the word embedding u˜ of the lemma of each query term
u ∈ q as:
q˜ =
∑
u ∈q
u˜ . (5)
Each exemplar query qe is then annotated to a cyber-aack type. For this purpose, we rst compute the cosine
similarity between an exemplar query expansion qe and seed query qj ∈ Q(0) as:
sim(qe ,qj ) =
q˜e · q˜j
| |q˜e | | · | |q˜j | | . (6)
e qj ∈ Q(0) which has the highest similarity value with qe determines the event type to which Qe belongs to. For the
complete event representation (Qe ,date, type) date information is extracted based on the time interval choosen for
DQE; for example in our experiments we run DQE on a daily aggregated collection of tweets. In this way we extract
the nal set of event tuples.
Fig. 1. Streamgraph showing normalized volume of tweets (August, 2014 through August, 2015) tagged with data breach (red), DDoS
activity (grey) and account hijacking (blue) type of cyber-security events.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Evaluation Setup
4.1.1 Dataset and Gold Standard Report. We evaluate the proposed method on a large stream of tweets from GNIP’s
decahose (10% sample) collected from August, 2014 through October, 2016. e total raw volume of our Twier dataset
across these 27 months is 5,146,666,178 (aer removing all retweets). en, from this raw volume we create 2 subset
collections:
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Fig. 2. Streamgraph showing normalized volume of tweets (September, 2015 through October, 2016) tagged with data breach (red),
DDoS activity (grey) and account hijacking (blue) type of cyber-security events.
• Fixed Keyword Filtered Tweets: We ltered 79,501,789 tweets that contain at least one matching term
from a list of cyber aack related keywords. ese are top 1000 keywords (ranked by TFIDF) extracted from
description texts of events in our gold standard report (see below).
• Normalized Tweet Texts: We extract and normalize tweet texts (aer removing accents, user mentions and
urls) to produce a collection of 3,267,567,087 unique texts to train a 200 dimensional word embedding via
gensim’s word2vec soware [27].
Note that the experimental results for the performance of our typed dynamic query expansion algorithm are done using
the entire raw volume of over 5 billion tweets. e total volume of tweets ltered from query expansion algorithm is
1,093,716 over the entire time period.
To evaluate our methods, we need Gold Standard Reports (GSR) on cyber security incidents to serve as ground-truth.
In particular, we focus on highly impactful events on data breach, DDoS and account hijacking based on two dierent
sources, Hackmageddon [2] and PrivacyRights [1]. In both sources, each event is characterized by an event type, date
(when the event was publicly reported), victim organizations and a short description.
• Hackmageddon is an independently maintained website that collects public reports of cyber security incidents.
Between January 2014 and December 2016, we extract 295 account hijacking events and 268 DDoS events. For
account hijacking, since we are using social media data, we mainly focus on hijacking aacks on social media
accounts (twier, instagram, facebook) by cyber crimes. Aer lering US-based events and matching the time
range of our Twier data, we obtain 55 account hijacking events and 80 DDoS events for GSR.
• PrivacyRights is a highly reputable repository for data breach incident reports. Between January 2014 and
December 2016, we extract 1064 data breach events reported by various sources. To enhance the accuracy of
GSR, we choose events reported by four large, well-known sources — “Media”, “KrebsOnSecurity”, “California
Aorney General”, and “Security Breach Leer”. en, we lter out data breaches caused non-cyber reasons
(e.g., physical the) and focus on the HACK category. Aer removing events with an unknown size of data
loss, and matching the time range with our data, we have 85 data breach events for GSR.
4.1.2 Baseline and Comparison Method. Our baseline for event detection uses the well-known Kleinberg’s algo-
rithm [13]. It identies time periods in which a target event is uncharacteristically frequent or “bursty” on a set of static
keywords. We extract an event if the size of this set of “bursty” keywords is larger than a threshold Tb .
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In this experiment, we use the 79.5 million Fixed Keyword Filtered Tweets and the 1000 static keywords to run the
baseline method. We set the threshold Tb based on small scale empirical tests on a few months of data, and manually
examine the detected events. We set Tb =36 which returns a beer event/noise ratio. We apply this threshold on all the
data and detects 81 events from August, 2014 through October, 2016. Each detected event is characterized as by a date
and a set of “bursty” keywords.
4.1.3 Matching Detected Events with GSR. Given a detected event presented by e = (Qe ,date, type), we developed a
semi-automatic method to detect if e is matchched with any event in GSR:
(1) For named entity in e , we check if it matches any event description in GSR, and get a matched collection from
GSR, say ME,
(2) Further lter ME by matching the event date between date in e and ME, with a time window as 3 (one day
before date , and one day aer date), and get a new lted event set, say FME,
(3) Compare the event type between e and event in FME, if the event type also matches, then event e is consider
as a matched event.
However, considering that the detected events are mined from Twier environment which may not use formal
keywords to describe the event. We will manually double check the event e if it fails the step 1.
Detected events by baseline will follow the same method to match against GSR. e only adjustment is to match the
“bursty” keywords of the detected events instead of named entities.
4.2 Measuring Performance
Precision and recall over dierent types of cyberaack events are summarized in Table 6. ese results shows that with
only a small set of seed query templates (as shown in Table 1), our approach can reach around 80% of precision for
data breach and DDoS events. is means our approach is able to handle the noisy Twier environment and perform
the cyberaack event detection accurately. e precision for account hijacking is not as high (66%). Careful manual
analysis (through Google search) indicates that we actually detected new account hijacking events that are not covered
by the GSR (Table 4). e manual validation results for data breach and DDoS events are shown in Table 3 and Table 5.
We also detected new events that are not covered by GSR for these two types.
Data breach events have a higher recall (75%). e relatively low recall for account hijacking and DDoS is explainable.
Both DDoS and account hijacking events have a rather short life cycle from occurring to being addressed. us their
signal in social media is relatively weaker. For instance, DDoS oen cause a few minutes to several hours of slow
internet, which may end even before people realized it. is intuition is validated in the baseline performance. e
extremely low precision and recall in Table 7 shows relying on “burstiness” is dicult to capture such events, possibly
due to their weak signals over noise.
4.3 Case Studies
We comprehensively show in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the wide range of events that our system is able to detect. Notice, the
clear burst in Twier activity that our query expansion algorithm is able to pick. rough the following case studies we
highlight some of the interesting cases for each of three cyber aack types, that our system detected.
Targeted DDoS Attacks on Sony and Dyn: In late, November 2014, a hacker group calling itself “e Guardians Of
Peace” hacked their way into Sony Pictures, leaving the Sony network crippled for days, allegedly perpertrated by North
Korea. We capture 12 separate events of DDoS aacks including four in last week of August 2014, starting with the rst
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Category Number of Detected Events GSR
Data Breach 227 85
Account Hijacking 127 55
DDoS Aacks 109 80
Duplicate 606 0
Rejected 581 0
Unspecied 390 0
Total 2040 220
Table 2. Number of cyber aack events in GSR and those detected by typed DQE.
Manually Veried Matched with GSR
Yes No
True Positive 22 156
False Positive 0 49
Table 3. Events detected of data breach type.
Manually Veried Matched with GSR
Yes No
True Positive 8 51
False Positive 0 31
Table 4. Events detected of account hijacking type.
Manually Veried Matched with GSR
Yes No
True Positive 20 29
False Positive 0 12
Table 5. Events detected of DDoS aack type.
on August 24th. Further in 2015, more ensuing aacks are captured one highlighted by the data breach of their movie
production house, on December 12th and then a massively crippling targeted, DDoS aack on their PlayStation network
in late December, 2015. Another noteworthy case of DDoS aacks in 2016, is the multiple distributed denial-of-service
aack on DNS provider “Dyn” from October 21st through 31st in 2016, that almost caused an worldwide internet outage.
Our system detects generates several query expansions, shown in Fig. 4 which clearly characterizes the nature of these
DDoS aacks where the hackers turned a large number of internet-connected devices around the world in to botnets
executing a distributed aack.
Ashley Madison Website Data Breach: In July 2015, a group calling itself “e Impact Team” stole the user data
of Ashley Madison, an adult dating website billed as enabling extramarital aairs. e hackers stole the websites´ all
customer data and threatened to release the personally identifying information if the site was not immediately shut
Manuscript submied to ACM
R. Khandpur et. al.
Event Type Precision Recall F-measure
Data Breach 0.78 0.74 0.76
Account Hijacking 0.66 0.56 0.64
DDoS Aack 0.80 0.45 0.58
Table 6. Typed DQE based event detection performance comparison.
Event Type Precision Recall F-measure
Data Breach 0.21 0.20 0.20
Account Hijacking 0.01 0.02 0.01
DDoS 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 7. Baseline’s event detection performance comparison.
Fig. 3. Word cloud and streamgraph analysis. The word cloud of all query expansions (size is proportional to the query’s feature
score) is produced from event detected for Ashley Madison website data breach. Streamgraph shows the bursty normalized volume of
tweets when events happen.
Fig. 4. A word cloud of all query expansions (size is proportional to the query’s feature score) produced on October 22, 2016
characterizing the DDoS aack on DNS provider Dyn.
down. On 18 and 20 August, the group leaked more than 25 gigabytes of company data, including user details. We are
able to detect this data breach on July 20, 2015. e word clouds in Fig. 3 clearly show how our method iteratively
expands from the seed queries to the expanded queries in the last, iteration 3 capturing a very rich semantic aspect
of the breach. Aer the initial burst as seen in the gure, we also see a second corresponding burst a month later, on
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August 20 when the user data is released anot now the top query expansion captured characterized by the mentions of
user data leak of the same website.
Twitter Account Hijackings: We were also able to detect with very high date accuracy, several high prole cases
of account hijackings of social media accounts of known personalities and government institutions including the Twier
account for U.S. Central Command which was hacked by ISIS sympathizers on January 12, 2015. We show in Fig. 5 that
our method not only identies the victim (“central command twier account hack”) but also the actor who perpetrated
the hacking (“isis hack twier account”).
Fig. 5. A word cloud of all query expansions (size is proportional to the query’s feature score) produced from event detected for U.S
CentCom Twier account hijacking.
5 RELATEDWORK
Cyberattack Detection and Characterization. Detecting and characterizing cyber aacks is highly challenging
due to the constant-involving nature of cyber criminals. Recent proposals cover a large range of dierent methods,
and Table 8 lists representative works in this space. Earlier work primarily focuses on mining network trac data for
intrusion detection. Specic techniques range from classifying malicious network ows [15] to anomaly detection in
graphs to detect malicious servers and connections [6, 7, 14, 23]. More recently, researchers seek to move ahead to
predict cyber aacks before they happened for early notications [16]. For example, Liu et al. leverage various network
data associated to an organization to look for indicators of aacks [18, 19]. By extracting signals from mis-congured
DNS and BGP networks as well as spam and phishing activities, they build classiers to predict if an organization is (or
will be) under aack. Similarly, Soska et al. apply supervised classiers to network trac data to detect vulnerable
websites, and predict their chances of turning malicious in the future [35].
In recent years, online media such as blogs and social networks become another promising data source of security
intelligence [21, 39]. Most existing work focuses on technology blogs and tweets from security professionals to extract
useful information [37]. For example, Liao et al. builds text mining tools to extract key aack identiers (IP, MD5 hashes)
from security tech blogs [17]. Saboke et al. leverage Twier data to estimate the level of interest in existing CVE
vulnerabilities, and predict their chance of being exploited in practice [30]. Our work diers from existing literature
since we focus on crowdsourced data from the much broader user populations who are likely the victims of security
aacks. e most related work to ours is [29] which uses weakly supervised learning to detect security related tweets.
However, this technique is unable to capture the dynamically evolving nature of aacks and is unable to encode
characteristics of detected events.
Event Extraction and Forecasting on Twitter. Another body of related work focuses on Twier to extract various
events such as trending news [3, 28], natural disasters [32], criminal incidents [38] and population migrations [25].
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Common event extraction methods include simple keyword matching and clustering, and topic modeling with temporal
and geolocation constrains [5, 36, 41]. Event forecasting, on the other hand, aims to predict future evens based on early
signals extracted from tweets. Example applications include detecting activity planning [4] and forecasting future
events such as civil unrest [26] and upcoming threats to national airports [12]. In our work, we follow a similar intuition
to detect signals for major security aacks. e key novelty in our approach, dierent from these works, is the need for
a typed query expansion strategy that provides both focused results and aids in extracting key indicators underlying
the cyber-aack.
Method Event Goal Data
Unsupervised Keyword
Expansion
Information
Extraction
Characterize
Event
Type Detection
[18] 5 5 5 5 5 X Cyberaacks Network Data
[29] 5 X X 5 X X Cyberaacks Twier
[24] 5 5 5 5 5 5 Cyberaacks WINE
[42] 5 5 X 5 5 5 Malware Papers
[14] 5 5 5 5 5 5 Malware WINE
[30] 5 5 X 5 5 X Vulnerability Twier
[7] X 5 5 5 5 5 Intrusion Network Data
[23] X 5 5 5 5 5 Intrusion Network Data
[8] X 5 5 5 5 5 Intrusion Network Data
[6] X 5 5 5 5 5 Insider Access Log
[17] X 5 X 5 5 5 IOC Tech Blogs
Ours X X X X X X Cyberaacks Twier
Table 8. Related work.
6 CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated an unsupervised approach to extract and encode cyber-aacks reported and discussed in social
media. We have motivated the need for a careful template-driven query expansion strategy, and how the use of
dependency parse trees and word embeddings supports event extraction. Given the widespread prevalence of cyber-
aacks, tools such as presented here are crucial to providing situational awareness on an ongoing basis. Future work is
aimed at broadening the class of aacks that the system is geared to as well as at modeling sequential dependencies in
cyber-aacks. is will aid in capturing characteristics such as increased prevalence of aacks on specic institutions
or countries during particular time periods.
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